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Abstract.  
 
This work analyses the effect on the daily electricity market of the authorisation of 3,909 MW of new 
photovoltaic (PV) power in Spain in 2017 –as a contribution to the EU environmental objectives for 2030. 
To estimate the impact of this additional offer, we use real data from the supply and demand curves of the 
Iberian (Spain and Portugal) daily electricity market. Our data is available for all the hours of the full year 
between August 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017. In this period, more than 800 agents have participated in the 
market, generating more than 15 million operations. In order to calculate the new supply function for each 
hour, the hourly production of these new facilities is added to the offer at zero price, since their marginal 
costs are very close to zeroand correspond to the offers that are being made by the current PV bidders. By 
using static and dynamic (multilevel) analyses, the variations of prices, quantities, emissions and surpluses of 
buyers and sellers are calculated. As the economic theory foresees, the new supply curve causes a decrease in 
average prices of 2.7 €/MWh in daylight hours(or 1.5€/MWh considering all the hours of the year), and 
an8% reduction in the income of the PV plants currently in operation (incumbents). The substitution of 
combined cycle energy (the technology expulsed) by PV energy brings about a saving of 2.2 million Mt of 
CO2 eq. In terms of economic welfare, the incorporation of PV power produces an increase in the total surplus 
of about 300 M€ each year. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
The aim towards a low-carbon economy worldwide helps understand the important changes faced by the 
electricity markets. The growing role of renewable energy sources (RES), the improvements in energy 
efficiency and the transport electrification are among the most important goals to achieve. These changes 
require important investments in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; an investment effort 
that has to be compatible with the final challenge of obtaining affordable electricity for households and 
industries (Erbach, 2016).  
 
The EU (2013) sets ambitious environmental targets in the document Green Paper: A 2030 framework for 
climate and energy policies, where, among other matters, it establishes a minimum RES share of 27% at the 
end of the period. Although there are several mechanisms to support RES, electricity auctions are becoming 
more popular in the EU Member States because they offer some advantages, such as the control of subsidies, 
that can be used to promote specific technologies, depending on their maturity and potential (García-
Redondo and Román-Collado, 2016; Newbery et al., 2018). Some other papers provide sonorous conclusions 
about the RES promotion through a Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) system; for example, Chatri et al. (2018) show, for 
Malaysia, that if additional revenues from subsidy reforms are re-allocated in order to finance the FiT 
framework, the production of renewable energies within the power generation sector gains weight.  
 
Spain stands out among EU Member States. The importance of RES in this country has been largely 
highlighted by Ciarreta and Espinosa (2010a; 2010b) and Bianco et al. (2019). A new frame regulation 
induced an important increase in RES production between 2007 and 2013 (Official State Bulletin (BOE, 
2007)). In 2013, the share of RES in the Spanish electricity market was around 57% (Ciarreta et al. 2014; 
2017). From then, no relevant changes in RES participation in the pool occurred until 2017 when, through a 
public auction procedure, the construction of 3,909 MW of new photovoltaic (PV) power and of 1,128 MW 
of additional wind power was authorised. 
 
Economic theory, through comparative static analysis, enables us foresee the effects of a rightward shift of 
the supply curve in the short-run. Firstly, a change is expected that reduces the equilibrium price of the 
electricity market and increases the equilibrium quantity. The magnitude of these changes will depend on the 
elasticity of the demand and supply curves. Secondly, these changes can be analysed from an environmental 
point of view, considering the effects on CO2 emissions. Thirdly, the changes in the electricity 
market’sequilibrium can also be analysed from a welfare point of view. The shift of the supply curve to the 
right will provoke a change in the buyer and seller surpluses, providing us with information about the impact 
on social welfare (total net surplus). Economic theory tells us about the importance of distinguishing the 
difference between the concepts of surplus and profit. Concretely, the producer surplus shows (in the short 
term) the difference between revenues and variable costs while profit indicates the difference between 
revenues and total costs. Therefore, a positive seller surplus (or contribution margin) will not necessarily 
imply a positive profit. 
 
The aim of this paper is the analysis of the economic and environmental impact produced by the 
incorporation of the new PV generation authorised into the Spanish wholesale market in 2017, such as the 
effects on equilibrium prices and quantities, the changes in the buyer and seller surpluses and CO2 emissions. 
The results will allow us to provide some energy policy recommendations.  
 
Some previous research literature has analysed the wholesale electricity market based on estimations. 
Thesepapers provide estimates of the effects that some policy measures have had on the spot market prices. 
By using an estimation of a complete system of hourly demand, Bigerna and Bollino (2016) have derived 
optimal zonal prices in the day-ahead Italian electricity market. Gelabert et al. (2011) model daily electricity 
prices and study the effects that the introduction of renewable electricity and cogeneration have had on the 
wholesale electricity prices in Spain Similarly, Sorknæs et al. (2019), using an energy system model for 
Denmark, found that regardless of the renewable electricity source, the price decreases as the amount of 
energy produced increases.  
 
Unlike these previous papers which make priori assumptions about the wholesale electricity market, other 
empirical analyses look for an understanding of the real market structure. In general, these studies focus on 
the possible existence of market power on the supply side. For example, the importance of the institutional 
and structural features of the Californian wholesale electricity market is highlighted by Joskow and Kahn 
(2002), who conclude that this is a non-competitive market where the suppliers exercise a power market. 
Genc (2016) analyses the Ontario wholesale electricity market using some market power measures, such as 
the Lerner Index and the Residual Supplier Index, to estimate the price elasticity of demand during peak 
hours of days, seasons and years. De Frutos and Fabra (2012) analyse the impact on equilibrium outcomes of 
covenant commitments among electricity producers in an oligopolistic model that reflects important 
institutional and structural features of the electricity market. Sensfuß et al. (2008) analyse the impact of 
privileged renewable electricity generation on the German electricity market, concretely, on spot market 
prices. Other studies which estimate the effect of renewable electricity generation on German spot market 
prices are Neubarth et al.’s (2006) and Bode’s (2006).  
 
Complementary to the above, there are other research papers where the wholesale electricity market is 
analysed based on real-time market information on prices and purchase and sale bids. The analysis of the 
structure of locational marginal prices (node prices) in day-ahead and real-time wholesale electricity markets 
has also been taken into consideration (Cui et al. 2018). In addition, Zarnikau et al. (2019), applying a 
regression-based approach to a newly developed sample of over 60,000 hourly observations from the Texan 
market, conclude that real-time energy prices are impacted by day-ahead prices and forecasting errors, and 
suggest that a greater trading efficiency may be achieved by improving forecast accuracy. Mayer and Trück 
(2018) analyse the wholesale electricity spot prices around the world and conclude that electricity markets 
organised as day-ahead markets exhibit a significantly lower overall price variation compared to markets 
based mainly on real-time trading. 
 
A field in which there is a lack of literature is that of the economic analysis of buyer and seller surpluses in 
the wholesale electricity market. From the seller's perspective, different aspects have been analysed. Bajo-
Buenestado (2017) focuses on the welfare consequences of introducing capacity compensation 
payments,concluding that they are more beneficial for consumers in a perfectly competitive market than in 
the presence of some market power. Bhattacharya et al. (2017) develop an applied-theoretic model and 
perform some simulations to analyse the welfare effects of the introduction of Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS). These authors conclude that, in general, consumers with a relatively stronger preference for 
green power are likely to gain from the RPS policy. Sauma and Oren (2019) apply a theoretical framework to 
analyse the incentives that generation firms have to support long-term transmission investments and 
conclude that in a two-node network, the net exporter generation firm has the correct incentives to increase 
the transmission capacity incrementally up to a certain point. From the buyer's perspective, Janda (2018) 
analyses the welfare consequences of introducing PV energy in the electricity market of the Slovak Republic, 
concluding that although there is a spot price reduction attributable to the PV penetration, the effects do not 
outweigh the costs of the support scheme, and therefore a consumer loss is finally produced.  
 
Related to the Spanish case, some research papers have analysed the introduction of RES in the Spanish 
wholesale market. Specifically, Gelabert et al. (2011) conclude that a marginal increase of 1 GWh of 
electricity production using renewables and cogeneration is associated with a reduction of almost 2 € per 
MWh in electricity prices –this work is carried out using data from 2005 to 2010, a period in which the 
regulation and behaviour of renewable producers was not stable in Spain. More recently, based on the bids of 
all the agents in the Spanish pool, Ciarreta et al. (2017) replicate the equilibrium situation in the electricity 
market during 2002-2013 and identify the possible changes in the bidding strategies of electricity producers 
after the introduction of RES. These authors conclude that the introduction of RES made the generators' 
behaviour more competitive in the short-run. Another recent analysis (for the period 2002-2017) of the 
Spanish case shows that, although the phasing out of the FiT mechanism reduces regulatory costs, it also 
limits renewable participation in the electricity market, leading to an increase in electricity prices and 
emissions (Espinosa and Pizarro-Irizar, 2018). Bianco et al. (2019) conclude that to complement intermittent 
RES and ensure the security of supply in the wholesale electricity market, the use of Combined Cycles Gas 
Turbines (CCGTs) has been improved, avoiding a larger diminishing of Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. 
 
The novelty of this paper is twofold. Firstly, the analysis is based on real hourly data. The OMIE data that we 
process provides us information about the purchase and sale bids of the daily electricity market. Data is 
available for all the hours of a full year (from August 1, 2016, to July 31, 2017). Secondly, the short-run 
economic and environmental impacts of the positive supply shock produced by the new PV power in the 
Spanish wholesale electricity market based on the real hourly data are seen, such as the effects on 
equilibrium prices and quantities, buyer and seller surpluses and CO2 emissions without the need to estimate 
or simulate any explicit model.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers some relevant notes on the current situation in the 
wholesale Spanish electricity market. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology proposed for 
estimating the effects on the Iberian market of the new PV power. In Section 4, the results of the empirical 
and econometric analysis are presented. Finally, Section 5 provides the main conclusions and policy 
recommendations.  
 
2. The Spanish electricity industry. The current situation. 
 
The Spanish electricity industry was structured as a vertically integrated monopoly from its creation in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century. Companies in the sector developed activities of the generation, 
transmission, distribution and commercialisation of electricity in their respective territories. The entry into 
force of Directive 96/92/EC (European Parliament, 2004) obliged the liberalisation of the electricity market 
in the European Union, requiring the separation of activities in which competition makes sense (generation 
and commercialisation) from those related to the network, which must be regulated given their nature of a 
natural monopoly. This Directive was then transposed into Spanish legislation, giving rise to the Law 
54/1997 on the Electricity Sector (BOE, 1997). 
 
Nowadays, the wholesale electricity market in the Iberian Peninsula is organised through the market operator 
OMIE (OMI-Polo Español S.A., Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energía), which is regulated by the Law 
24/2013 of the Electricity Sector (BOE, 2013). Its functions were previously defined, in the Decree 
2019/1997 (BOE, 1997), which also set up and regulated the electricity generation market. In this market, the 
production companies, on the one hand, and the commercial companies and large customers, on the other 
hand, formulate their energy offers and demands respectively for each hour of the following day. This 
process involves more than 800 agents and generates nearly 15 million operations per year. In 2018, the 
energy distributed in the peninsular market reached 254 TWh and almost 30 million supply points, with a 
maximum peak powerdemand of 41 GW (Red Eléctrica Española (REE), 2019). 
 
The price-setting process results from the matching of the offer and demand bids formulated by the agents 
for each of the 24 hours of the following day (day-ahead market), although 6 auctions are held throughout 
the day to adjust for possible variations in demand as well as possible interruptions of generating groups (this 
is the intraday or real-time market). The intraday market has a small effect on the final price paid by 
consumers. Thus, the extra cost that this market represents in the electricity hourly price in Spain has an 
average annual value of 0.004 € and a standard deviation of 0.07 €, which represents the negligible value of 
0.01% of the price. From our point of view, integrating the intraday market in our analysis would add 
complexity without producing significant changes in our results, so we have chosen to analyse only the daily 
(or day-ahead) market, which is the one where the bulk of the electricity is negotiated. The day-ahead market 
represents a marginal system; that is, the price offered for the last unit incorporated into the market will serve 
to remunerate all participating generators. 
 
Table 1.  Installed power and energy by technology in Spain. 2018. 
 
MW % GWh %
Combined Cycle 24948 25.2 33648 13.6
Wind 22922 23.2 47508 19.1
Hydro 20358 20.6 20695 8.3
Coal 9536 9.6 42422 17.1
Nuclear 7117 7.2 55540 22.4
Cogeneration 5818 5.9 28175 11.3
Solar PV 4439 4.5 8000 3.2
Solar thermal 2304 2.3 5348 2.2
Other renewables 852 0.9 3599 1.5
Waste 582 0.6 3187 1.3
Fuel 0 0 0 0
Total 98877 100 248122 100
EnergyInstalled Power
Source: CNMC (2019) 
 
While nuclear and renewable generators typically present a price-taker behaviour (they offer all their 
production at zero price in accordance with their marginal costs in the short term), thermal groups (combined 
cycles and coal-fired power plants) make simple offers (based on their marginal costs) and, at times, 
complex offers. The offers with complex conditions are regulated by the 30th operating rule of OMIE (BOE, 
2018), which provides three types of conditions: the minimum income, gradients and the indivisibility 
condition. These complex conditions are associated with the existence of quasi-fixed factors (Filipini, 1996).  
 
Once an equilibrium price is obtained from the matching process between demand and supply (with complex 
conditions) bids, other components (extra-costs) are added to that price, such as those associated with the 
System Operator, the interruptibility service, the power guarantee and technical restrictions. In particular, the 
process of technical restrictions allows the System Operator to order the entry into the market of higher-price 
generators in order to guarantee the capacityand security of the network. The extra-price paid does not apply 
to the rest of the generators, being distributed, like the rest of components, as an additional cost to all the 
energy exchanged. The modelling of these constraints requires a deep knowledge of the network (Roldan et 
al., 2017) and this does not contribute much to the objective of this research. So, for the sake of simplicity, 
the equilibrium without considering technical constraints is considered to be our market outcome.  
 
The Spanish electricity sector is undergoing major changes, both on the supply side (closure of coal and 
nuclear power plants, CO2 emissions taxes, penetration of renewables, etc.) and on the demand side 
(installation of batteries for energy storage, demand response through the use of smart meters, etc.). All these 
changes are included in the NECPs (Integrated National Energy and Climate Plans) monitored by the 
European Commission, and in the Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan 2021-2030 (PNIEC), which 
indicates the specific dates of application of each NECPs initiative. The plan contemplates increasing the 
share of renewables to 42%, incorporating a power of 30,000 MW in this period (Ministerio para la 
Transición Ecológica, 2019). During 2017, through a public auction procedure, the construction of 3,909 
MW of new photovoltaic (PV) power and of 1,128 MW of additional wind power was authorised. This 
increase in the power installed will produce in the next years a shift in the hourly supply curve which will 
reduce equilibrium prices and will displace (ceteris paribus) other conventional technologies out of the 
market (merit-order effect), with the consequent reduction in CO2 emissions. While wind production 
modelling is relatively complicated, PV production is quite predictable, it being possible to calculate the new 
hourly generation and, therefore, the new supply functions.  The commitment of the Spanish Government is 
fully justified, as it is the European country with the highest irradiation (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.  European solar resource map. Source: www.solargis.com 
 
Another particular characteristic of the Iberian market is the relatively weak connection with neighbouring 
systems (the French and Moroccan markets), what makes it work almost like an electric island, in contrast to 
what happens in Central Europe, where the market is highly meshed, integrated and interconnected. This 
feature of the Iberian market makes the system’s response to possible supply shocks more idiosyncratic.  
 
A third characteristic that makes the Iberian case interesting is the evolution of the degree of concentration in 
the electric supply. The liberalisation process, together with the introduction of renewables, has led to the 
entrance of new players in the Iberian market, decreasing, consequently, their degree of concentration. Table 
2 shows the market shares of each corporate group in the wholesale market between 2008 and 2017 and (in 
the last column) the value of the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) concentration index, which is given by the 
formula: 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where N is the number of participants and Siis the i
thparticipant's market share 
expressed in a percentage. Its value ranges between 0 (infinite participants) and 10,000 (in the case of the 
market presenting monopoly conditions). 
 
A wide range of authors relate the conditions of competition in a market to its levels of concentration –see 
for example Newbery (1995), Wolak (2000), Stoft (2002) and Helman (2006). Although there are several 
indicators to measure market concentration, such as the Lerner index (Landes and Posner, 1981), the Must 
Run Ratio (Gan and Bourcier, 2002), the Must Run Share (Wang et al., 2004), the System Interchange 
Capacity (Goncalves and Vale, 2003), the Location Privilege (LP), and the Surplus deviation index 
(Bompard et al., 2006), among others, the HHI (Tirole, 1988) is the most widespread among international 
regulators. 
 
Table 2.  Generation market shares (Si) and HHI. 2008-2017. 
 
Source: CNMC (2019) 
 
The European Commission considers that competition problems are unlikely in a market with an HHI less 
than 2000 and in which the largest agent has a share of less than 25% (European Parliament, 2004). Some 
regulatory authorities, such as for example the US Department of justice (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010) 
consider a market to be highly concentrated if the HHI exceeds 2500, and moderately concentrated if the 
HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500. Similar to Ciarreta et al. (2016), we conclude thatthe competitive 
conditions are reasonably assumed and our real data on hourly supply curves adequately reflect, according to 
OMIE, the marginal variable costs of the bidders, even in bids with complex conditions. 
 
3. Material and methods. 
 
The data on electricity supply and demand used in this work comes from the Iberian market operator 
(OMIE). This body manages the wholesale electricity market in the Iberian Peninsula (daily and intraday 
markets), where market agents trade the electricity amounts that they need at publicly stated and transparent 
prices. Its operating model is the same as the one implemented by other European markets. Participating in 
the market involves accessing an electronic platform (via the Internet) which permits the simultaneous 
participation of a large number of agents. In this platform, a high number of bids for the purchase and sale of 
electricity is produced over a short period of time, so the OMIE has to control the invoicing and settlement of 
the energy traded, including financial aspects.  
 
In particular, the data used in this study comes from the daily market, with the offer including complex 
offers. The purpose of the daily market is to manage electricity transactions for the following day through the 
presentation of electricity sale and purchase bids by market participants. Sellers on the electric power 
production market are obliged to comply with the Electricity Market Activity Rules by signing the 
corresponding contract of adherence. Bids submitted by these sellers are presented to the market operator 
and will be included in a matching procedure that will affect the daily programming schedule corresponding 
to the day after. All the available production units that are not bound by physical bilateral contracts are 
Year HHI ENDESA IBERDROLA EDP GNF VIESGO AXPO ACCIONA 
ENERGYA 
VM 
WIND TO 
MARKET 
NEXUS DETISA OTHERS
2008 1.484 27% 22% 13% 16% 1% 4% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 10% 
2009 1.176 20% 23% 13% 11% 4% 7% 3% 2% 2% 1% 2% 14% 
2010 1.255 19% 24% 12% 9% 3% 8% 5% 2% 2% 2% 2% 12% 
2011 1.251 23% 21% 12% 7% 2% 9% 5% 3% 2% 2% 1% 12% 
2012 1.236 23% 18% 16% 8% 2% 9% 5% 3% 2% 2% 1% 12% 
2013 1.304 21% 19% 19% 7% 1% 8% 6% 3% 3% 2% 1% 10% 
2014 1.396 21% 21% 20% 6% 1% 7% 5% 2% 3% 2% 1% 10% 
2015 1.299 21% 18% 19% 7% 2% 7% 5% 2% 3% 2% 1% 13% 
2016 1.279 21% 21% 14% 7% 2% 9% 6% 3% 3% 2% 1% 11% 
2017 1.266 23% 18% 16% 6% 3% 8% 6% 3% 3% 2% 2% 12% 
required to submit bids for the daily market. Buyers in the electricity market are the relevant retailers, 
resellers and direct consumers. Buyers can submit bids to buy electricity on the daily market. However, to do 
so, they must comply with the Electricity Market Operating Rules. Once the operations in the daily market 
are integrated, a correspondence algorithm (called Euphemia) finds the equilibrium point (price and quantity 
exchanged) for each hour of the next day. 
  
The data analysed contains, for each hour, the matched and unmatched offers and demands (demand or 
purchase offers) of electricity at each price level. These data allow calculating the supply and demand curves 
of the Iberian electricity market (Spain and Portugal) by the aggregation of the sale and purchase bids, 
respectively.The period under study has been between August 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017. No relevant 
changes were produced in the Spanish wholesale electricity market during that period, which can be 
considered representative of this market.  
 
The main advantage of having data of the entire supply and demand curves (for each hour within the year) is 
that it allows us to calculate the market equilibrium and the surpluses of sellers and buyers directly, without 
the need to estimate or simulate any theoretical or empirical model based on a finite sample of observations. 
Since the demand curve shows the buyers' willingness to pay, the buyer's surplus is calculated as the hourly 
cumulative sum up to the equilibrium quantity (𝑄𝑡𝑖
𝐸𝑞
) of the difference between each buyer's willingness to 
pay (𝑊𝑡𝑖
𝑃𝑎𝑦
) ad the market equilibrium price (𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑞
).  
 
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 =  ∑ ∑ (𝑊𝑡𝑖
𝑃𝑎𝑦 − 𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑞)𝑄𝑡𝑖
𝐸𝑞𝑛º 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑖=1
8760
𝑡=1                                 (1) 
 
Likewise, the seller's surplus is calculated as the hourly cumulative sum up to the equilibrium quantity (𝑄𝑡𝑖
𝐸𝑞
) 
of the difference between the equilibrium price (𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑞
) and the sellers’ willingness to charge (𝑊𝑡𝑖
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒
, short-
term marginal cost, if competitive conditions are assumed).  It makes sense to consider complex offers as the 
marginal cost, because they include both variable and quasi-fixed factors (Filippini, 1996). 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 =  ∑ ∑ (𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑞 − 𝑊𝑡𝑖
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒)𝑄𝑡𝑖
𝐸𝑞𝑛º 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑖=1
8760
𝑡=1                             (2) 
 
Finally, the total surplus (economic welfare) will be the sum of the surpluses of buyers and sellers. 
 
The objective of the following section is to perform real comparative statics (on an hourly basis and in terms 
of surplus) of the Iberian electricity market between August 1, 2016, and July 31, 2017, considering the entry 
of new PV energy in the market. To calculate the new market situation, we need to estimate the energy 
produced by the 3,909 MW of PV power authorised by the Spanish government. The Photovoltaic 
Geographical Information System (PVGIS) tool2 (European Commission, 2017) provides the hourly values 
of available PV energy per kWp according to the geographical location. This study presumes that all the PV 
power is installed at a central point in Spain, with irradiation levels equivalent to the average of the current 
PV facilities installed on the peninsula (in fact, the facilities will be spread throughout Spain, so errors 
should be compensated). In order to estimate the contribution of these new PV energy generators to the 
supply function, it is assumed that they are willing to offer at any positive price (the same situation as the 
currently existing PV generators), given their zero marginal cost in the short term–this assumption is also 
compatible with what economic theory predicts for competitive markets. 
 
4. Empirical analysis of the Iberian electricity market. 
 
4.1. Market equilibrium and surpluses without the quota of new PV generation. 
 
The tables and figures of this section describe the real situation of the Iberian electricity market in the one-
year period analysed. Table 3 shows the average hourly values and the accumulated yearly values of the 
main variables analysed. The hourly price has an average value of 50.9 €/MWh, with a standard deviation of 
12.0 €/MWh and a maximum price of 102 €/MWh. On the other hand, almost 30,000 MWh are exchanged 
every hour on average, with a standard deviation close to 5,000 MWh. 
 
                                               
2 On the tool PVGIS, see http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pvgis. 
The complete visualisation of the marketallows us to calculate the surpluses obtained every hour by buyers 
and sellers, respectively. Thus, on average, the sum of both surpluses (i.e., the total surplus) is of about 4 
million Euros per hour, of which nearly 3 million € correspond to the buyers. The average surplus of sellers 
is close to 1 million €/hour on average, although it reached a maximum value of 2.8 M€ on January 19 at 
9:00 p.m. In a full year (8760 hours), buyers have accumulated a surplus that is close to 26 billion euros 
(72% of the total accumulated surplus), while sellers have amassed a surplus of almost 10 billion euros 
(28%). This percentage distribution is compatible with the consumers' perception of the great value of 
electricity, and the high opportunity cost of being without it –in fact, the buyer surplus could be much higher 
if we did not take into account that the maximum purchase price in the Spanish daily market is set at 180 € 
per MWh. 
 
Table 3. Description of the variables before the entry of new Energy. 
 
 
The two graphs of Figure 2 show, respectively, the evolution of the equilibrium price and quantity in the 
daily market. Specifically, the daily average of the hourly price (the first graph) and the daily cumulative 
value of the hourly energy (the second graph) are represented. These values are also accompanied by their 
respective monthly averages in order to smooth out their high intraweek volatility. In both series, price and 
quantity, a clear seasonal component is observed: June and July, on the one hand, and from November to 
February, on the other, are the months with the highest prices and quantities. Obviously, behind this 
seasonalevolution, there are movements of supply and/or demand that can be captured with our exhaustive 
database. 
 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hourly price (€/MWh) 50.9 12.0 2.3 102.0
Hourly electricity (MWh) 27,544 5,090 14,507 41,156
Buyer hourly surplus (€) 2,949,195 500,996 1,496,656 4,402,908
Seller hourly surplus (€) 1,130,886 372,415 43,782 2,830,462
Total hourly surplus (€) 4,080,081 777,141 1,925,600 6,030,127
Buyer annual surplus (€)
Seller annual surplus (€)
Total annual surplus (€)
25,831,999,488
9,905,426,432
35,737,427,968
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 Figure 2.  Evolution of equilibrium price and quantity in the daily market. August 1, 2016, to July 31, 2017. 
 
The two plots of Figure 3 depict the evolution of the daily market surpluses in levels and percentages 
respectively –the daily values are the result of accumulating the hourly surpluses generated throughout the 
day. The seller surplus follows an evolution quite similar to that of the market price, it is relatively high at 
the beginning of summer and in winter. The evolution of the buyer surplus is flatter than that of the sellers 
and has a less clear pattern. In percentage terms (the second graph), the buyer surplus oscillates around 70%, 
while that of the sellers does so around 30%. This percentage gap narrows significantly in the month of 
January, where the distribution is closed from 60% to 40%. 
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 Figure 3.  Evolution of the market surpluses in the daily market. August 1, 2016, to July 31, 2017. 
 
4.2. Market equilibrium and surpluses with the quota of new PV generation. 
 
As was mentioned in Section 2, during the year 2017, the Spanish Government authorised the construction of 
3,909 MW of new PV power under advantageous conditions for the developers. In addition to providing the 
connection point, the Spanish Government assured a minimum price for its energy production, with the 
corresponding mitigation of the financial risk. The objective of this regulatory measure was to reduce 
Spanish CO2 emissions, which contributes to achieving the commitments assumed in the Paris Agreement.  
 
A new market equilibrium arises once the energy generated by these new PV facilities is incorporated into 
the hourly supply curve, while the hourly demand function remains the same –as we will see next, the 
inelastic nature of the electricity demand curve is an important factor in our comparative statics. It makes 
sense to analyse this supply shock in the short term, since the construction and connection time of these 
plants must be relatively short due to the technology’s relative simplicity. Moreover, the fact that the 
promoters have to financially endorse their plants in order to access the business ensures, to a certain extent, 
the start-up of the facilities.  
 
As described in Section 2, for the estimation of the variation in the energy supply, it is assumed that all new 
PV facilities are located at a geographical point with an average irradiation (this average value is the one of 
the current facilities in operation). Under this assumption, the PV-GIS tool allows us to calculate the hourly 
PV production. Once the energy produced each hour with the new PV power is known, it is assumed that this 
energy is offered to the market at its marginal cost, which is close to zero, as it is the one of the PV facilities 
that are currently in operation. In this way, the supply curve experiences a parallel shift to the right in the 
hours of sunshine.  
 
The following tables and figures analyse the variation that occurs in the main market variables when the new 
PV energy is supplied. Table 4 shows that the hourly electricity is on average 2.7 €/MWh cheaper with the 
new supply curve –this effect on the price is also in line with that achieved by Gelabert et al. (2011) for the 
Spanish case–, while the hourly consumption increases by 359.7 MWh.These values correspond to the hours 
of sun; if the average values were calculated taking into account all the hours of the year, they would be 1.5 
€/MWh and 198.5 MWh respectively. As for the market surpluses, that of the sellers falls about 18,000 € per 
hour on average, while that of the buyers increases by about 81,000 € per hour (both figures refer to sun 
hours). These hourly results, accumulated during all the hours of the year, give rise to a loss of seller surplus 
of 83.4 million € and a gain of consumer surplus of 380.5 million €. As a result of this, the total surplus 
increases about 297 million euros in a year. As predicted by economic theory, when analysing the effects of 
new technology, it is important to keep in mind that what is bad for firms is not necessarily bad for society as 
a whole. Improvement in generation technology can be bad for marginal sellers who become increasingly 
unnecessary, but it is surely good for consumers who pay less for electricity. 
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Table 4. Description of the variation of the variables after the entry of new PV energy. 
 
 
If we divide the total new PV energy offered in the year, which is 6,025,700 MWh (2.5% of the annual 
exchanged quantity), between the 4,687 hours of PV generation (53.5 % of the total hours of the year), an 
average hourly energy of 1,285.6 MWh (every sun hour) is obtained. Then, our datasuggest that one 
additional MWh of new PV electricity reduces the hourly price by 0.0021 €/MWh –this result comes out of 
dividing the hourly price reduction (2.7 €/MWh) by the additional energy in every hour of sunshine (1,285.6 
MWh). From these data, we can do the following linear extrapolation: if an additional capacity of 3,909 MW 
can generate 1,285.6 MWh of additional energy every hour of sunshine, 15 MW of PV power would 
generate approximately 5 MWh of electricity each hour of sunshine, contributing to reducing the hourly 
price (in sunny hours) by 1 € cent (–0.01 € = 5 MWh x –0.0021 €/MWh), and to increasing the annual total 
surplus by 1.14 M€ approximately. If this reasoning is applied to all the hours of the year (not only to 
sunshine hours), it is obtained that to achieve a reduction of 1 € cent in the hourly price, it would be 
necessary to install about 25 MW of new PV plants. These results can be presented as a rule of thumb, that 
is: The average price of energy will decrease by 1 c€ for every 25 MW of new PV generation installed. This 
decrease will be greater (in absolute values) in the hours of more irradiation, being zero at night (see Table 
4) and presenting an average value of 1.7 c€ in the hours of sunshine. In the hours of maximum irradiation, 
the reduction of prices would be higher than 10 c€. 
 
In the light of the previous results, the impact of the commissioning of the 3,909 MW authorised by the 
Spanish government will represent a reduction of around 8% in the revenue of the current PV producers 
(incumbents), a reduction that should be taken into account by these companies when they make their 
financial projections, development plans or mergers and acquisition movements. To estimate this reduction, 
the revenue that a 10 MW PV plant would get before and after the commissioning of the authorised PV 
power has been simulated for each hour of the year, obtaining that its revenue would be reduced from 
790,133 to 730.456 €. 
 
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the price and quantity differentials once we consider the generation of new 
PV energy. The negative variation of the (24 hours) average daily price (the first graph) and the positive 
variation of the (24 hours) average daily quantity (the second graph) are greater in the spring and summer 
seasons, periods when the solar production is more important and/or the electricity demand moderates.  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
New PV electricity (MWh) 1285.6 832.6 10.9 2699.1
Hourly price differential (€/MWh)
(total hours of the year)
-1.5 2.2 -17.1 0.0
Hourly price differential (€/MWh)
(sunlight hours of the year)
-2.7 2.4 -17.1 0.0
Annual quantity differential (MWh)
Buyer annual surplus differential (€)
Seller annual surplus differential (€)
Total annual surplus differential (€)
1,685,977
297,148,416
-83,389,440
380,538,880
  
Figure 4. Evolution of price and quantity variations. August 1, 2016, to July 31, 2017. 
 
As for the surpluses, Figure 5 shows the evolution of the respective daily surplus variations, all of them 
expressed in levels ad in percentages. The first graph shows that the variation of the daily buyer surplus is 
around 1 million €, although it reaches a maximum value close to 3 million € on June 30, 2017. On the other 
hand, the variation in the seller surplus is negative and oscillates around –0.5 million €; the maximum fall of 
this surplus reaches –2.5 million euros the same day as before (June 30, 2017). On the whole, the daily total 
surplus experiences a positive variation that moves below, but close to, 1 million € throughout the period. In 
relative terms (the second graph), the entry of new PV energy causes a weight gain of the buyer surplus in 
the total surplus (with the corresponding weight loss of seller surplus) which oscillates around 1 percentage 
points over the year, although on specific days this gain may exceed three percentage points.  
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Figure 5. Evolution of surplus variations. August 1, 2016, to July 31, 2017. 
 
Our analysis continues with the study of market dynamics. For this purpose, we propose the estimation of a 
linear mixed model of the hourly price in the Spanish wholesale electrical market. Linear mixed or multilevel 
models are models containing both fixed effects and random effects. They are a generalization of linear 
regression allowing for the inclusion of random deviations other than those associated with the overall error 
term of the model –on multilevel analysis, see for example Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Goldstein 
(2011). They have been used in a wide range of domains, such as education, medicine, labour market, etc., 
but their presence in studies on the behaviour of the electricity markets is scarce at present. There are some 
studies that use this technique to predict either load profiles or electricity prices. For example, Koen et al. 
(2014) presents an approach that uses multilevel models to develop scenario forecasts for South African load 
profiles, which can then be used to support decisions regarding the electricity generation capacity required –
their data show a high degree of correlation among intra-day hours. Tso and Guan (2014) estimate a 
multilevel regression model to calculate the magnitude and significance of effects of environment indicators 
and household features on residential energy consumption un the US. According to these authors, the benefit 
of this approach is that, based on stratified sampling schemes, allows to extract cluster effects from total 
variations of the dependent variable. García-Martos et al. (2007) state that they estimate a mixed model for 
short-run forecasting of prices in the Spanish Electrical Market but, in our opinion, the term ‘mixed’ is 
confusing in this article because, rather than estimating a multilevel model, these authors simply propose to 
model 24 hourly time series separately, instead of modelling a complete time series of the prices. As far as 
we know, there are no previous studies that make use of in-sample predictions, in a multilevel residuals 
scheme, to compare markets with different scenarios of renewable electricity supply. 
 
After trying several specifications, we propose an autoregressive AR(2) two-level model of the hourly 
market price which is going to be estimated in the two scenarios generated in this article: with and without 
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the new PV power. In the mixed model, the first level corresponds to the hourly observations and the second 
level to the 365 days of the year. When hourly observations are nested in their respective days, we are 
admitting that hours of the same day tend to be more alike than hours chosen at random from the population. 
Different reasons may explain the specificity of each day of the year: festive days, weather conditions, 
political issues, religious celebrations, sporting events, power grid problems, etc.; our model allows to 
control this kind of unobservable heterogeneity.  
 
As can be seen in the following equations, the model proposed assume that purely random effects affect the 
intercept of the model and the slopes of the dummy variables on the day of the week –the likelihood-ratio 2 
test of null hypothesis of no different in fit between nested models favours this specification against other 
nested alternatives–: 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 1 model: 
Ph|d = β0,d + (β1,2 … β1,12) (
DFebruary
…
DDecember
) + (β2,1,d … β2,6,d) (
DMonday
…
DSaturday
) + (β3,2 … β3,24) (
Dhour 2
…
Dhour 24
)
+ εh|d 
(3) 
with εh|d = ∅1εh−1|d + ∅2εh−2|d + uh|d    where   uh|d iid~ N(0, σu
2) 
 
Level 2 model (specific day in the year, 365 days or groups of 24 hours):  
β0,d = γ00 + v0,d     where  v0,d iid~ N(0, σv
2), cov(v0,d, uh|d) = 0 
(4) 
β2,j,d = γ2,j + w2,j,d  where w2,j,d iid~ N(0, σw2,j
2 ), cov(w2,j,d, uh|d) = 0, cov(w2,j,d, v0,d) = 0 for  j = 1, … ,6 
 
Integrating both models:  
𝑃ℎ|𝑑 = 𝛾00 + (β1,2 … β1,12) (
D𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦
…
D𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟
) + (γ2,1 … γ2,6) (
D𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
…
D𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦
) + (β3,2 … β3,24) (
Dℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 2
…
Dℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 24
) + 
+ 𝑣0,𝑑 + (w2,0,d … w2,6,d) (
D𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦
…
D𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦
) + ∅1εh−1|d + ∅2εh−2|d + uh|d 
(5) 
 
The response variable is the hourly electricity price Ph|d. The fixed part of the model is composed of the 
global average price for all the hours (γ00) plus the dummy variables which control for the month of the year 
{ D𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 ,…, D𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 }, the day of the week { D𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 , … . , D𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦 } and the hour of the day 
{Dℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 2 , … , Dℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 24} –dummies D𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 , D𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦  and Dℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 1 are omitted from the estimate in order to 
avoid multicollinearity. The random portion of the mixed model is composed of two parts. On the one hand, 
the coefficients (𝑣0,𝑑; w2,0,d … w2,6,d) measure the specificity (random intercept) of every particular day of 
the year (𝑣0,𝑑) and the cross-effects (w2,0,d … w2,6,d) that every particular day of the year has on the slopes 
of the weekday dummy variables –effectively, our data confirm that the effect of the weekday on the hourly 
electricity price depends on the particular day of the year in which we are. Note also that the coefficients of 
weekday variables (β2,j,d = γ2,j + w2,j,dj = 1, … ,6) have been estimated as random slopes in the model, but 
given their character of dummy variables (0 or 1), they end up conditioning the intercept of the model. On 
the other hand, the overall or level 1 error term (𝜀ℎ|𝑑) is supposed to follow an autoregressive structure of 
order 2 in order to control for the temporal correlation between successive level 1 residuals; this means that 
two more coefficients are estimated in the model (∅1 and ∅2). In summary, in our mixed model the average 
hourly price of a specific day within the year can move away from the global average of the year and, in 
addition, the intraday prices can move away, only temporarily, from their specific average. 
 
The 2-level model has to be estimated by using maximum likelihood techniques (or by Bayes methods) since 
it has got a composite error term whose variance is partitioned into the between-day variance component (the 
variance of the level 2 residuals) and the between-hour variance component (the variance of the level 1 
residuals). Table 5 shows the results of estimating the mixed model using as dependent variable the market 
equilibrium price without (model 1) or with (model 2) the new PV power allowed by the Spanish 
Government. In order to measure the pure effect of the new PV power, both estimates use only the sun hours 
(where there is PV generation). 
 
  
Table 5.  
Multilevel model for hourly electricity price in Spain. Estimation results. 
 
 
Examining the estimation results of the fixed portion of models (1) and (2), we observe that the dummy 
variables for month, day of the week and hour of the day are significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Moreover, the coefficients of the dummy variables that control for the month and the day of the week are 
similar in both models, the same not happening with the coefficients of the hours of the day, whose 
difference increases between 12:00 pm and 14:00 pm; that is, the price of electricity is more than 4 € cheaper 
in those hours in model (2), logically due to the greater weight of solar production in this second scenario 
(note that the intercepts of both models are quite similar, just over 52 € per MWh). 
 
The dummies for months show a relevant price increment in winter –for example, January is more than 30 
€/MWh more expensive than August or September in both models. The coefficients for weekday dummies 
illustrate that Sunday is the cheapest day and Wednesday and Thursday the most expensive (these two days 
are about 13 € more expensive than Sunday in both models). Finally, the most expensive sun hours are those 
that go from 10:00h to 12:00h –for example, in model (1), electricity at 11:00 am is 8.32 €/MWh more 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
February -20.77 1.41 -14.77 0.00 -21.28 1.45 -14.63 0.00
March -30.07 1.36 -22.09 0.00 -31.00 1.41 -22.03 0.00
April -30.33 1.37 -22.16 0.00 -31.22 1.41 -22.07 0.00
May -27.72 1.36 -20.42 0.00 -28.71 1.40 -20.46 0.00
June -23.89 1.37 -17.44 0.00 -24.88 1.42 -17.58 0.00
July -25.2 1.36 -18.56 0.00 -26.50 1.40 -18.89 0.00
August -33.09 1.36 -24.33 0.00 -34.49 1.41 -24.53 0.00
September -30.33 1.37 -22.06 0.00 -31.03 1.42 -21.83 0.00
October -19.68 1.37 -14.37 0.00 -19.86 1.42 -14.02 0.00
November -15.81 1.38 -11.44 0.00 -15.77 1.43 -11.03 0.00
December -11.8 1.38 -8.54 0.00 -11.37 1.43 -7.94 0.00
Monday 11.25 1.04 10.79 0.00 11.77 1.08 10.93 0.00
Tuesday 12.27 1.05 11.71 0.00 12.90 1.08 11.91 0.00
Wednesday 12.8 1.05 12.22 0.00 13.45 1.08 12.42 0.00
Thursday 12.71 1.05 12.13 0.00 13.32 1.08 12.30 0.00
Friday 12.37 1.05 11.8 0.00 12.97 1.08 11.97 0.00
Saturday 6.11 1.05 5.84 0.00 5.93 1.08 5.48 0.00
Hour 7 2.22 0.15 14.7 0.00 1.83 0.17 11.03 0.00
Hour 8 4.95 0.22 22.14 0.00 3.93 0.24 16.30 0.00
Hour 9 7 0.26 26.78 0.00 5.06 0.28 18.12 0.00
Hour 10 8.26 0.29 28.8 0.00 5.21 0.30 17.11 0.00
Hour 11 8.32 0.3 27.39 0.00 4.28 0.32 13.28 0.00
Hour 12 7.61 0.31 24.17 0.00 2.75 0.33 8.23 0.00
Hour 13 7.26 0.32 22.58 0.00 2.03 0.34 5.93 0.00
Hour 14 7.03 0.33 21.62 0.00 1.75 0.35 5.03 0
Hour 15 5.81 0.33 17.78 0.00 0.84 0.35 2.41 0.02
Hour 16 4.26 0.33 13 0.00 0.17 0.35 0.49 0.63
Hour 17 3.81 0.33 11.62 0.00 0.92 0.35 2.6 0.01
Hour 18 5.08 0.33 15.46 0.00 3.75 0.35 10.58 0
Hour 19 6 0.34 17.89 0.00 5.62 0.36 15.47 0
Hour 20 7.43 0.36 20.94 0.00 7.6 0.39 19.73 0
Constant 59.01 1.2 49.01 0.00 59.62 1.25 47.79 0
Random-effects 
Parameters
 Estimate Std. Err.  Estimate Std. Err.
day: Identity
var(R.Weekday) 23.03 2.21 19.09 27.79 23.54 2.45 19.2 28.87
Residual: AR(2)
Ф 1 1.24 0.02 1.21 1.27 1.19 0.02 1.16 1.22
Ф 2 -0.41 0.02 -0.45 -0.38 -0.36 0.02 -0.4 -0.33
var(ɛ) 15.21 1.07 13.26 17.45 17.87 1.37 15.37 20.78
LR test vs. linear model
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expensive than at 6:00 am; this figure drops to 4.28 €/MWh in model (2). These results do not have to match 
with those observed in other countries, for example, Ketterer (2014) finds that the electricity price in 
Germany remains high at the beginning of the week (falling from Friday onward), and observes that, in 
October and November, the price is significantly higher than in January, which is not our case. 
 
The random part of the model allows us to estimate the two variance components, the between-day variance 
component (variance of level 2 residuals) and the between-hour variance component (variance of level 1 
residuals). The variance of the level 2 residuals is somewhat greater than 23 in both models, or said 
otherwise, the standard deviation of the random effect of the specific day of the year is approximately 5 
€/MWh. As for the level 1 AR(2) residuals, we observe that the sum of the two autoregressive coefficients 
(∅1 and ∅2) is less than the unit in both models (0.83 in both cases), so the hourly electricity price follows an 
stationary process –on autoregressive models see, for example, Hamilton (1994), Lütkepohl (2005), and 
Stock and Watson (2001). Moreover, the variance of the white-noise disturbance (𝑢
2 ) is 15.21 in model (1) 
and 17.87 in model (2). Therefore, compared to model (1), model (2) results in a lower mean price prediction 
but a greater price variance; this higher volatility is possibly due to the fact that the PV energy, which is 
greater in model (2), is intermittent (power generation from solar panels cannot be scheduled in advance and 
depends on the level of irradiation in each hour). 
 
Mixed-modelling research often focus on the fixed effects, with random effects included only to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the data. However, random effects can themselves be values of interest. Mixed 
models offer the possibility to estimate the best linear unbiased predictions (BLUP) of random effects. 
Figure 6 allows analysing these effects. The graph (a) of the figure depicts the random intercepts in model 
(1) for each specific day of the year (random intercepts of model (2) are quite similar), while the graph (b) 
shows the standard deviation of level 2 residuals for each day of the week in both models –keep in mind that, 
for each day of the week {𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦, … . , 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦}, we have 52 BLUP random effects that depend on the 
specific day of the year. As can be seen in graph (a), there exists unobservable heterogeneity associated to 
the specific day of the year, and this heterogeneity causes increases or decreases in the price that can exceed 
20 €/MWh. For its part, graph (b) shows that the greatest price dispersion due to the effect of the specific day 
of the year occurs on Sundays; ergo, considering only the 52 Sundays of the year, the level 2 random effects 
have a standard deviation of about 6 €/MWh in both models –this standard deviation is approximately 4 
€/MWh the rest of the days. This fact makes sense due to the less industrial nature of Sunday's electricity 
demand. On Sundays, electricity demand is lower and comes mainly from households (its fixed industrial 
component is smaller), so the market price is more influenced by temperature and weather conditions than 
other days of the week. 
 
 
 Figure 6. BLUP of Level 2 random intercepts. 
 
4.3. CO2 emissions. 
 
In the previous sub-section, the effect on the daily market of introducing the PV power assigned in the 2017 
auctions has been analysed. The entrance of more PV capacity in the supply curve involves the incorporation 
of clean (zero emission) energy and the expulsion of marginal technology from the market. The TSO, Red 
Eléctrica de España (REE), provides information on the technologies that, each hour, participate in the 
market according to their order of merit. The incorporation of emission-free energy from the new PV plants 
will lead to an expulsion of the marginal technology, which in all the cases in our data (sunshine hours) 
corresponds to the combined cycle technologies –if the incorporation of PV power had been greater, it could 
have also displaced the coal plant technology, but this is not the case in our data. 
 
According to the Spanish System Operator (REE), the CO2 emission rate of the combined cycle technology 
is 370 gCO2/kWh (Arcos-Vargas et al., 2018). The solar energy incorporated into the market does not 
generate emissions, and the energy displaced (coming from the combined cycle) allows avoiding 0.37 Mt. 
CO2 per MWh. As we have seen in the previous sections, the incorporation of the 3,909 MW of PV 
generation will generate a little more than 6 TWh of additional energy, so that the CO2 savings can be 
estimated as follows: 
 
CO2 Emission Reduction = 0.37 
Mt.  CO2
MWh
· 6 TWh ·
1,000,000 MWh
1 TWh
 = 2,220,000Mt CO2        (4) 
 
This figure would be the contribution that this PV generation initiative would have to reach the national 
commitments that Spain adopted in the Paris Agreement (Arcos-Vargas, 2016).  In order to make an 
economic valuation, one has to consider the long-term CO2 price, which S&P Global Platts figures at 35-40 
€/Mt (Watson, 2018). With this price, the additional benefits obtained from the incorporation of PV 
generation would amount to 80 Million€ per year approximately. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications.  
 
This paper quantifies the impact that the commissioning of the new PV facilities (3,909 MW of PV power) 
approved by the Spanish Governmentin 2017 will have on the Spanish electricity market. The effects are 
measured in terms of market price, quantity exchanged, CO2 emissions, and economic surpluses across the 
market. As the complete supply and demand curves of hourly electricity in the day-ahead market are known, 
the study looks directly at the electricity market, instead of estimating or simulating behavioural models from 
a given data sample. The complete characterisation of the Iberian daily market is possible thanks to the data 
on purchase and sale bids published by the Iberian Operator Market (OMIE).  
 
According to our data, the economic welfare (total surplus) transmitted to society by the daily electricity 
market between August 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017 is very large (35.7 billion €). Most of this welfare (72%) 
corresponds to the buyer’s side, which is consistent with the high value that users give to electricity. In 
temporary terms, the month in which the greatest welfare is generated is January, which coincides with the 
period of higher prices and hourly quantities exchanged. In this month, the buyer surplus' share decreases by 
up to 60%.  
 
The entry into service of the PV power allocated in the 2017 auction will enable the supply to generate an 
additional clean energy of 6 TWh in a year, which represents 2.5% of peninsular energy demand. This 
positive supply shock has been analysed by using comparative statics and by estimating an ARIMAX model 
for the hourly electricity price. Three main results are extracted from the analysis. On the one hand, a 
positive supply shock consisting of the introduction of 1 MWh of PV electricity will reduce the electricity 
price by 0.002 €/MWh on an hourly average (in the hours of sun). Likewise, 25 MW of new PV power 
would be needed to reduce the average hourly price by 1 € cent. Thisprice reduction will be greater (in 
absolute values) in the hours of more irradiation, being zero at night and presenting an average value of 1.7 
c€ in the hours of sunshine.  
 
The potential impact of the commissioning of the 3,909 MW authorised by the Spanish government will 
represent a reduction of around 8% in the revenue of the current PV producers (incumbents), which must be 
taken into account when making their financial projections, development plans or mergers and 
acquisitionmovements. 
 
Regarding environmental issues, the CO2 savings for replacing contaminating technologies with non-
contaminating ones will amount to 2.2 million Mt; this saving will contribute to the Spanish Government's 
compliance with the commitments adopted in the Paris Agreement. On the other hand, in terms of economic 
welfare, the greater electricity supply will cause an increase in total surplus of 300 M€ in a year, although its 
distribution will be asymmetrical. While the buyer surplus will increase by almost 400 M€, the seller surplus 
will decrease by about 100 M€.  
 
Our analysis shows that a new situation arises in the market when additional PV energy is introduced into the 
equation. This supply shock positively affects the system as a whole but causes the expulsion of less efficient 
firms (mainly combined cycle units) and the reduction of the joint contribution margin of the companies that 
remain in the market. To redirect this situation to a Pareto optimum, a monetary compensation could be 
given to those companies with less efficient technologies which would leave the market if they could not 
maintain their contribution margins and financial results. In return, these companies should offer support to 
the auxiliary services of the market and to the security of the network, which simultaneously improves the 
system’s reliability and security, increasing the buyers’ surplus, without reducing the sellers’ initial surplus. 
 
For future research, the effect on the electricity market of other supply shocks (the closure of coal-fired 
power stations, nuclear power stations, higher levels of penetration of renewables, etc.) and demand shocks 
(the electrification of transport, heating, industrial applications, etc.) could be analysed. The richness of 
OMIE’s databases allows addressing these types of analysis. 
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